Ceballos Supreme Court of California, 12 Cal. Two teenagers subsequently tried to break into his garage, whereupon one was shot in the face. Tennessee v. The suspect was a minor, had a slight build, and was not armed. The policeman shot the suspect solely to prevent him from escaping. A police officer may not use deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect unless he has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.
The convictions stemmed from a protest staged by the defendants in order to bring attention to United States involvment in El Salvador. The court held that the necessity defense was not intended as justification for illegal acts taken in indirect political protest. Unger Supreme Court of Illinois, 66 Ill. Defendant claimed that he escaped because other inmates threatened to rape and kill him. Defendant wanted to assert the defenses of necessity and compulsion at trial, but was denied instructions on these defenses.
Necessity can be an affirmative defense to the crime of escape. Relevant factors to be used in assessing claims of necessity are: " 1 The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; 2 There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; 3 There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; 4 There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other 'innocent' persons in the escape; and 5 The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
Green Tennessee Court of Appeals, S. Defendant had a long history of mental illness and pleaded the insanity defense. The court held that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing sanity, and thus the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
Topolewski v. State Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Wis. The employee notified the company of the plan. Accused then took the barrels as planned and was arrested.
Where the owner of the property by himself or through his agent, actually or constructively, aids in the commission of the offense the would-be criminal cannot be found guilty on all the elements of the offense. Robinson v. The court held that the California statute making addiction to narcotics a crime violated the Constitution because it was a cruel and unusual punishment. Powell v. Defendant claimed that he could not help being drunk due to his alcoholism, and that to punish him for being an addict was a violation of his constitutional rights.
Court held that it was not a violation of defendant's constitutional rights because he wasn't being punished for being drunk, but for being drunk in a public place. When determining whether the overt acts of a defendant rise to the level of a criminal attempt, "The law There was no evidence to support the conviction of one of the brothers on the substantive offense. An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.
Motive or intent may be proved by the acts or declarations of some of the conspirators in furtherance of the common objective.
Victim was a year-old who the defendant believed was stealing a bottle of orange juice. A struggle ensued when the defendant attempted to retrieve the juice. A the victim turned to leave the store, after putting the juice on the counter, defendant shot her in the back of the head at a distance of approximately three feet. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
A just punishment should: 1 protect society, 2 punish the defendant for wrongdoing, 3 encourage the defendant to be good in the future, 4 deter other crimes, 5 incapacitate the defendant, 6 make restitution for the victim, and 7 be comparable to punishments for similar crimes. Defendant ran a phone answering service. He admitted that he knew some prostitutes used his service to set up appointments for their services.
Beardsley Supreme Court of Michigan, Mich. While he was away at work, victim remained at the home and took several morphine pills and died as a result. Defendant was charged and found guilty of manslaughter for failure to take care of victim. Courts will not impose liability for a mere moral obligation, rather a court will require that defendant had a legal duty to the victim, knowing her to be in peril of her life, which required him to make all reasonable and proper effort to save her.
The omission to perform said duty would makes him responsible for her death. Wilcox v. When someone acts to encourage another in the commission of an illegal act, they satisfy the actus reus of accomplice liability. A defendant's consciousness of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that a child is under seventeen is not knowledge under the criminal code.
Even if a defendant's disregard of the risk was a "gross deviation" from the norm, this "is 'recklessness', nothing more. Brown Supreme Court of California, Cal. Appellant claimed that he didn't intend to keep the bicycle, he just wanted to get even with the owner.
Appellant was convicted and appeals on account of error in an instruction given to the jury. The court held that the jury instruction contained error because it implied that the boy could be convicted even if his intent was to deprive the owner only temporarily of the bicycle.
The court held, however, that in order for the conviction to be sustained intent must be to deprive the owner of the property permanently. Utter Court of Appeals of Washington, 4 Wash. Utter contends that his actions were a "conditioned response" and that as as a result of his jungle warfare training and experiences in World War II, he was prone to react violently towards people approaching him unexpectedly from the rear.
He therefore argues that his violent act towards his son was no voluntary. It is merely a physical event or occurrence for which there can be no criminal liability.
However, unconsciousness does not, in all cases, provide a defense to a crime. When the state of unconsciousness is voluntarily induced through the use and consumption of alcohol or drugs, then that state of unconsciousness does not attain the stature of a complete defense. Conley Illinois Appellate Court, Ill. Conley, was charged with two counts of aggravated battery based on permanent disability and great bodily harm, after he was found to have hit victim in the mouth with a wine bottle, causing jaw and tooth injury and permanent lip numbness.
Among other contentions, Conley "asserts that while it may be inferred from his conduct that he intended to cause harm, it does not follow that he intended to cause permanent disability.
Whight California Court of Appeals 36 Cal. The man was convicted of driving while intoxicated through circumstantial evidence. Cunningham Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 Q. Among his psychological maladies was an obsession with his nose. The victim was his co-worker. The two worked as dishwashers.
The victim was teasing and joking with the defendant and snapped a towel at him several times. The victim finally snapped a towel, which flipped the defendant on the nose. The defendant took a knife from his pocket and stabbed the victim in the neck.
There must be some length of time that lapses between the intent to kill and the actual murder. Police discovered a loaded semiautomatic gun in a zipped-up bag under the closed tarp of defendant's truck bed. In addition to possession of methamphetamine, Foster was also convicted "of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.
This means the firearm must have been immediately available for use by the defendant. First, he claims that it is unconstitutionally vague, "because "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Where possible the language of a statute will be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd consequence. Mochan Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Pa. Defendant now appeals on the grounds "that the conduct charged in the indictments, concededly not a criminal offense in this State by any statute, does not constitute a misdemeanor at common law.
Among other things, a District Court judge required defendant to perform hours of community service consisting on standing in front of a post office with a sandwich board reading "I stole mail. This is my punishment. Probation and supervised release conditions must meet a "reasonable relation" test to statutory objectives.
Further, "a public apology may serve a rehabilitative purpose. He argues that "the Government had to prove not only that he intended the unauthorized access of a federal interest computer, but also that he intended to prevent others from using it, and thus cause a loss. Kibbe v. Defendant then left him on the side of the road without his eye glasses. Victim was then hit by a passing car. Defendant was charged and convicted of robbery and murder in the second degree.
He appeals arguing that the court erred in not defining causation to the jury. He argues the state erred in excluding evidence that he was told and believed that she was in fact a year-old, and claims the state must prove that he knew she was younger than While penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, the construction must ultimately depend upon discerning the intention of the Legislature when it drafted and enacted the law in question.
To that end, the Court may appropriately look at the larger context, including external manifestations of the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. If a jury finds that a defendant had a good faith belief that he was entitled to take property, even if the belief is unreasonable by the objective standard of the reasonable person, the defendant should be acquitted because the requisite specific intent is not present.
Velazquez v. Defendant was charged and sentenced for vehicular homicide, and he appeals the court's decision imposing liability for the sole purpose of defendant's participation in the race. Where a victim is killed by his own voluntary recklessness, a defendant will not be liable for the death for merely participating in the same conduct.
The requirement of proximate cause is not present. Oxendine v. State Supreme Court of Delaware, A. The previous day defendant's girlfriend had struck defendant's son and caused tears in his intestines. Defendant appeals arguing that the medical testimony was insufficient to find that he is guilty. A doctor's testimony that a certain thing is possible is no evidence at all. His opinion as to what is possible is no more valid than the jury's own speculation as to what is or is not possible.
Almost anything is possible, and it is improper to allow a jury to consider and base a verdict upon a "possible" cause of death. Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals the conviction, arguing that the court erred in its jury instructions. Defendant parked the car some feet away from the scene of the accident and fled. Defendant was charged with two indictments, leaving the scene of an accident and manslaughter.
He has brought a bill of exceptions to the court. Both shot their victims and left them in a brain dead state. Afterward, their next of kin consented to having their organs donated and then removed life support. The defendants claim that due to "the absence of clear instruction, the juries may have erroneously concluded that defendants would be guilty of homicide if their conduct was the legal cause of the victims' "brain death" rather than the victims' ultimate state of cardiorespiratory failure.
State Supreme Court of Arkansas, Ark. He appeals from the state's finding of first degree murder claiming there was no premeditation. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and argues that he did not have the requisite malice for the charge. There are "two required elements of implied malice, namely existence of an objective risk and subjective awareness of that risk. Defendant went home, got a gun and shot victim after victim lunged forward to punch or grab defendant.
During the jury trial, the jury asked the meaning of an "intentional act" and the court agreed with the prosecution that it was the "pulling of a handgun in the manner described.
Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction. The People now appeal to the Supreme Court of California. The concept of implied malice has both a physical and a mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance of 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. The mental component, as set forth earlier, involves an act 'deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.
Whether a defendant's underlying acts are inherently dangerous in the abstract is not dispositive in the jury's determination as to whether a defendant acted with malice.
Hernandez Missouri Court of Appeals, S. He "contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence. Reputation or character testimony is admissible only when a defendant has put his own reputation in issue.
The Supreme Court has stated that the meaning of murder committed in the perpetration of a felony within " does not require a strict causal relation between the felony and the killing; it is sufficient if both are 'parts of one continuous transaction. Whether the defendant has reached such a place of safety is a question of fact for the jury.
Howard Supreme Court of California, 34 Cal. On appeal, defendant asks the court to consider the requirements for the second-degree felony rule. That is, [it determines] whether the felony by its very nature cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed.
Robertson Supreme Court of California, 34 Cal. The court seeks to determine whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that defendant could be found guilty of second degree felony murder if the killing was committed in the course of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner.
Help What Is Courtroom Cast? City of Chicago v. Dudley and Stephens. Coker v. Superior Court. United States. Cheek v. McCleskey v. New York. Pinkerton v. Superior Court Du. Gebardi v. Garnett v. Attorney General for Jersey v. Midgett v. Berry v. Nieto Benitez. In , the City of Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits people from loitering with one another in any public place. Several men went sailing and were caught in a storm and pushed out to sea. Two defendants transported heroin into the United States believing it to be cocaine.
Petitioner escaped from prison and broke into the home of a husband and wife. Petitioner put his knee into the stomach of Mrs. Police officers arrested Martin at his home, where he was drunk, and then took him to a highway and then arrested him for being drunk on the highway.
A man underwent surgery, during which he suffered from cardio-respiratory arrest. Defendant failed to register his firearm. Federal corrections officer was arrested at a club for carrying an unregistered weapon; he thought he was included in the exceptions for peace officers in the statute. An American Airlines pilot was convicted for failing to pay income taxes. Defendant stabs wife 19 times after repeated verbal provocation by his wife, including telling him that she wanted a divorce, never loved him, and had filed charges against him for abuse.
Defendant kills a woman he was dating after she breaks up with him, and was charged with second-degree murder. Child of defendant parents died when an abcessed tooth became gangrenous, preventing the child from eating and eventually leading to pneumonia. Defendant and the man she was living with beat her two-year-old daughter until she went into respiratory arrest.
Defendant, a hitchhiker, killed and robbed two men who had picked him up. Defendant, a black man, was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of murder. Plaintiff takes defendant home in plaintiff's car.
Defendant, a 17 year-old male, had sex with the 15 year-old plaintiff in the plaintiff's bedroom late one night. Three doctors became acquainted wih a nurse at a party. Patterson and his wife seperated. Defendant was indicted of second-degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. Defendant was approached by 4 youths on a subway car. A wife killed her husband by shooting him three times in the back of the head while he was sleeping.
Defendant set up a spring gun to protect his garage from intruders after some of his property had been stolen. A policeman shot and killed a suspect that was fleeing from the scene of a buglary after ordering him to halt. Defendants appeal their conviction for obstructing the activities of the IRS office in Tucson, Arizona and failing to comply with the order of a federal officer.
Defendant was convicted of escape after he walked off of an "honor farm" while serving a sentence for auto theft. Defendant was convicted of killing a police officer. The accused arranged to have an employee of the Plankinton Packing Company place three barrels of the company's meat on the loading platform, the plan being that the accused would load the barrels on his wagon and drive away as if he were a customer.
Defendant was convicted of being addicted to narcotics after two police officers witnessed scar tissue and needle marks on his forearm. Defendant was convicted under a Texas Statute prohibiting public drunkeness.
Defendant was arrested, along with three accomplices, for attempted robbery. Two brothers were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The defendant ran a liquor store with her husband. Defendant was indicted on conspiracy to commit prostitution. Defendant drank liquor with victim for several days at his residence. We deleted the subheading in front of the Anderson excerpt. Chapter 9 Theft Offenses remains basically the same. Chapter 10 Defenses — In the self-defense section of this chapter, we replaced the excerpt on the Yoshihiro Hattori case with an excerpt on shooter bias.
We consolidated the note on the duty to retreat and the note on stand your ground laws and put these notes into a new section 2. We also revised the text in this section to clarify that a majority of states today do not impose a duty to retreat.
Gruber also informs the reader about racial disparities in the application of self-defense doctrine regardless of whether the state in question has a stand your ground law. We deleted Jenkins v. State , a Florida case, since the court in that case applies the duty to retreat rule, which is no longer good law in Florida. A description of the Trayvon Martin shooting is provided in an author footnote in the new Lee excerpt on shooter bias and in the revised note on retreat rules. In State v.
Stewart , we added an author footnote, letting the reader know that the referenced North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in State v. Norman was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. We edited the dissenting opinion in State v. Stewart in an effort to shorten this very long case. In the section on the necessity defense, we deleted two paragraphs in Hutchins where the court references two cases Thurber and Iglesia because students reading this might get confused and think there is a surrender to authority requirement in the necessity defense.
We added a note following Hutchins to let the reader know that as recently as January , the Department of Veterans Affairs continues to refuse to allow research into whether medical marijuana can benefit veterans suffering from PTSD and chronic pain. Hunter , we added an author footnote, letting the student reader know that compulsion is just another name for duress since several 1L students in Prof.
He received life for the killings of Glenn Moore and Rick Shroeder, but got the death penalty for another killing in Florida, and was electrocuted in for that crime. We also deleted some text in this section that was redundant of text found in the Freeman case. We also added language letting the students know that duress is sometimes called coercion or compulsion.
We also moved some language in the introductory text to keep all the material about the common law together and all the material about the MPC together. Chapter 11 Attempts. Hinkhouse , we deleted all references to the attempted assault charges and intent to commit serious physical injury so students would not get confused and think intent to commit serious bodily harm is sufficient for attempted murder.
Sexuality, Gender and Consent. We added a note preceding United States v. Thomas , explaining that at common law, courts recognized four types of impossibility, explaining these different types of impossibility and giving examples of each type.
Thomas , we added a reference to Joshua Dressler's Understanding Criminal Law in author footnote a where we explain that there are two types of legal impossibility: pure legal impossibility and hybrid legal impossibility.
We also added a new author footnote c to explain that an overt act by any member of the conspiracy is sufficient to satisfy the overt act requirement for all members of the conspiracy. We added a note following the Thomas case, showing that even in MPC jurisdictions, questions of impossibility can still arise and be recognized.
Chapter 12 Accomplice Liability. In the introductory text, we added a note that causation is not a required element for accomplice liability.
In Wilson v. We deleted two paragraphs from the Wilson case to try to trim the chapter. In Roy v. Chapter 13 Conspiracy. We made some light edits to the introductory text, including clarification that most jurisdictions today require proof of some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by any member of the conspiracy.
We also added a note in the introductory text that the trial of a conspiracy case may be held either in the jurisdiction where the agreement was formed or in any locale where any overt act by any of the conspirators took place. We deleted some text in People v. Lauria to try to trim the case.
We also lightly edited the note following Lauria on the mens rea with respect to attendant circumstances. We also edited the description of the Pinkerton case in the note on the Pinkerton rule.
The main change to this chapter was that we deleted Sections E and F the last four cases in this chapter since neither author assigns these cases. Chapter 14 Crime and Punishment. We changed the section titles slightly and moved some of the articles accordingly. Section A reviews the history of punishment. In the Cole excerpt, we added some author footnotes, noting that California and other jurisdictions have recently legalized marijuana. Section B Contemporary Institutional Issues in Criminal Law covers institutional issues such as overcriminalization, misdemeanors, collateral consequences, implicit bias, and the underfunding of public defense.
We also moved the Markus Dirk Dubber article on possession crimes to this section on institutional issues. This new section focuses on drug crimes in response to the request of at least one casebook user.
Section D, as before, introduces students to alternatives to conventional criminal punishment: problem-solving courts and restorative justice. We kept the article by Mark Umbreit and others on restorative justice. Law faculty who have created an account can sign in after receiving email notification that registration has been approved. Email accountmanager westacademic. Other Higher Education Faculty who wish to access digital review copies or teaching resources should contact their West Academic Account Manager at college westacademic.
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